Federal Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Securities Market by Frey, Alexander Hamilton
University of Pennsylvania
Law Review
FOUNDED 1852
Formerly
American Law Register
VOL. 106 NOVEMBER, 1957 No. 1
FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE OVER-
THE-COUNTER SECURITIES MARKET
Alexander Hamilton Freyt
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout this Article 1 the term "over-the-counter securities
market" refers to transfers of securities other than through the medium
of a stock exchange and in which brokers or dealers 2 are participants
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. M.A., 1920, Columbia Univer-
sity; LL.B., 1921, Yale University; J.S.D., 1925, Yale University.
1. This Article is a revision and compression of an unpublished monograph that I
prepared as one of a series of studies of the over-the-counter securities market made by
the Securities Research Unit of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania
under the sponsorship of the Merrill Foundation. In the preparation of this essay I
have tried to explore the writings of all those who have published any relevant ma-
terial. These authors are too numerous for me to thank individually, but I take this
opportunity to express my gratitude to all those who have preceded me in this field for
the ideas and information that I have derived from them. To Louis Loss, however, I
wish to acknowledge a signal indebtedness. His volume on Securities Regulation is so
comprehensive and so thorough that it is virtually impossible for one to write exten-
sively on any portion of this subject without impinging upon some area of his monu-
mental work. I have profited greatly from Loss' pioneering treatise and I welcome this
opportunity to express my especial thanks.
2. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines the terms "broker" and "dealer"
as follows: The term "broker" means "any person engaged in the business of effecting
transactions in securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank."
48 STAT. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(C) (1952). The term "dealer" means "any per-
son engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account,
through a broker or otherwise, but does not include a bank, or any person insofar as he
buys or sells securities for his own account, either individually or in some fiduciary
capacity, but not as part of a regular business." Ibid.
Throughout this Article the terms "broker" and "dealer" are used as above de-
fined. The term "broker-dealer" is used where a person combines the activities of both
broker and dealer, or where there is uncertainty as to whether a person is acting in the
one capacity or the other.
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either as agents or as principals. This study is confined to an inquiry
into the regulations affecting the purchase and sale over the counter
of existing securities. Hence, original issues of securities, either
through public offerings or private placement, are not within the scope
of this paper. As a major part of the activity of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission relates to the regulation of original issues and of
stock exchange transactions, only those portions of the work of the
SEC will be analyzed that are concerned directly or indirectly with
over-the-counter transactions in existing securities.'
The basic concept of "regulation" is herein employed not in a
narrow but in an inclusive sense. Securities are a species of property
and all transfers of property are subject to some form of regulation.
Buyers and sellers of property are generally conceived of as acting "at
arm's length": if after negotiations they agree upon the terms of a pur-
chase and sale, the transaction is binding upon each, even though one
of them may thereby benefit at the expense of the other from his su-
perior knowledge or astuteness. There is, however, an important ex-
ception to this generalization. The law may be invoked to set aside
or modify the results of transactions deemed to be tainted by fraudulent
conduct. Such governmental interventions, whether by legislative en-
actment, judicial decision or administrative ruling, constitute "regula-
tion" in the broad sense in which that term is used in this Article. With
respect to the purchase and sale of securities, regulation has been ad-
dressed principally to four types of misconduct: misrepresentation,
manipulation, non-disclosure, and malpractices on the part of brokers
and dealers. The major parts of this Article will be devoted to an
examination of federal legislation relating to each of these categories.
From the fact that the purpose of this Article is to present a study
of regulation of the over-the-counter securities market it must not be
inferred that there is a substantial body of regulations peculiarly ap-
plicable to over-the-counter transactions. Actually there are very few
regulatory measures that have such limited application. Over-the-
counter securities transactions are but a segment of the entire area of
securities transactions. Many of the rules that in the aggregate consti-
tute "federal regulation of the over-the-counter securities market" are
nothing more than an application of rules that relate generally to sales
of securities whether over the counter, or through an exchange, or by
direct dealing between buyer and seller.
3. To be sure, the over-the-counter market, as well as the stock exchange, is in-
cidentally affected by the character and extent of original issues that may provide
material for subsequent transfers of securities, but the gestation period is deemed too
remote for inclusion within the limits of this Article.
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II. THE NEED FOR FEDERAL REGULATION
The need and the justification for federal legislation dealing with
malpractices in securities transactions arise from the fact that the rem-
edies developed by the common law and by state legislatures are so
inadequate.
A. The Common-Law Remedies
Literally interpreted, the maxim caveat emptor imposes severe
risks upon the buyer. But the common law has devised three causes
of action applicable to the plight of a buyer who has been deceived or
defrauded. These are warranty, rescission and deceit.
It might seem that an action for damages based upon a breach of
warranty would provide a deceived or defrauded purchaser of a security
with as much protection as a purchaser of goods. But this is not the
case. A defect in a commodity can usually be discovered quickly, but
false representations as to a security are not easily ascertainable. A
security may pass through many hands before the "defect" is discov-
ered and the ultimate loss may fall upon a purchaser having no knowl-
edge of the representation that proved to be false. Moreover, in ascer-
taining and measuring the buyer's loss a defective commodity may
generally be compared to a similar commodity minus the defect. But
each issue of securities is unique, and there is no same security minus
the misrepresentation with which to compare it. Furthermore, there
are a multitude of factors that may influence the value of a security, and
when a price decline occurs it is extremely difficult to demonstrate that
this loss resulted directly from the discovery that a particular repre-
sentation was false. In reality the law of warranty has had very little
application to the sale of securities. The late Dean Harry Shulman
explains this as follows:
"Only a warranty of title and that the stock or bond is a
general security of the kind which it purports to be on its face is
imposed on the seller by implication from the mere sale. No
warranty is implied as to the quality or value or that the security
was not issued in contravention of constitution, law or corporate
charter. The buyer is held to have, and exercise, his own judg-
ment as to value; and he is charged with knowledge of legal de-
fects in the security. The liberality in treating representations in
the sale of goods as warranties is absent in the security cases.
Affirmations, no matter how positively made, are not warranties
unless an intent to warrant is shown. There has not been any
tendency to extend the reach of warranty to remote seller or issuer.
And the doctrine seems not to differentiate between sales by indi-
vidual investors and sales by dealers or issuers." 4
4. Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 Y-= L.J. 227, 230 (1933).
1957]
4 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
The second common-law remedy which may be available to a de-
frauded buyer of goods, that of rescission, likewise has many short-
comings when securities are the subject-matter of the sale. Rescission
based upon misrepresentation is available only to the person who bought
directly from the misrepresenter. Hence the remedy of rescission can-
not be invoked by buyers of securities induced to make stock market
purchases on the strength of false representations in circulars or pro-
spectuses, because such misrepresentations are not those of the imme-
diate seller. This limitation obviously excludes a very substantial group
of investors in securities. The common law places other obstacles in
the path of the buyer who seeks to rescind on the ground of misrepre-
sentation: he must return to the seller the subject-matter of the sale;
he must act promptly; he must avoid all conduct that can be construed
as a ratification or as inconsistent with a desire to rescind; he must
show that the seller misrepresented a material fact; and he must show
that he relied on the truth of this false statement. In the case of securi-
ties transactions these hurdles are so difficult to surmount that the
common-law action of rescission is seldom an adequate remedy for the
misled purchaser of stocks or bonds.-
According to legal dogma the elements of the third common-law
remedy, an action for deceit, are a false representation of a material
fact, plus scienter on the defendant's part and plaintiff's reliance on the
representation, as a result of which he is damaged. The buyer is obvi-
ously confronted with many pitfalls: the difficulty of demonstrating the
falsity of a partial truth, or of an ambiguity, or of a statement literally
true but nevertheless misleading to the average person; the necessity
of identifying that which is material rather than inconsequential or
irrelevant; the burden of distinguishing between expressions of fact
and statements of law or opinion or forecast or assurance; and the
buyer of securities has the especially difficult problem of proving that it
was not a tip sheet or the general market condition, but a false repre-
sentation upon which he relied, and that this reliance was the proximate
cause of damage that he actually incurred.
The impact of the common law upon fraudulent sellers of securities
is realistically summarized by Dean Shulman as follows:
"In the ideal of the law, then, issuers and sellers of securities
have lived under very great risks of liability, at least to their
immediate vendees. But they have lived well because the reality
was not so harsh. Reality was sporting: very few investors
brought suit. Reality was indulgent: the men empowered to
decide cases made many allowances for the practices of the times.
5. Id. at 231.
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And reality recognized that the ideal required only truth in state-
ments made, not that full statement be made; that sales could be
promoted with only scant statement; that troublesome questions
could be avoided by omitting mention of a variety of matters and
confining circular and prospectus to truthful descriptions of the
show window without taking the investor through the store
behind it." 6
This tolerant attitude of the common law toward non-disclosure
is based upon the theory that each of the parties has equal access to
pertinent information and that, as if bargaining were a game, he who
is shrewder or more industrious in gathering facts is entitled to the
better score. But in the sale of securities there are transactions in
which the initial knowledge of the parties is quite disparate, or in
which but one of the parties has access to the only source of additional
information. A typical example is that of a corporate director or other
insider withholding his inside knowledge while engaging in trans-
actions for the purchase or sale of the corporation's securities. The
common law, however, has been slow to impose any duty of disclosure
upon a director trading in shares of the corporation; and the duty
which it does impose is quite limited in scope.
7
With respect to certain types of misconduct by a broker, such as
striving to serve both buyer and seller in a securities transaction or
concealing his status as one of the parties in such a transaction, the
common-law rules of principal and agent are applicable. But a broker
may resort to other malpractices such as inducing a customer to trade
excessively in order to increase commissions, improperly utilizing in-
formation obtained as a result of the confidential relationship between
broker and customer, or favoring an important customer at the expense
of one whose account is deemed by the broker to be of less value, and
as to such abuses relief available at common law is highly inadequate.
Furthermore, one of the greatest temptations of a dealer is that
of extracting an exorbitant profit for himself from a given transaction
with a customer, and against this the common law provides little or
no protection if the status of the dealer as such was clearly revealed,
although it may not have been understood or appreciated by the
customer. A dealer may resort to high-pressure tactics in merchandis-
ing his wares and if his conduct is not "misrepresentation" or "fraud,"
the customer has no redress at common law, although the dealer's acts
may be unethical or even immoral.
6. Id. at 242.
7. For example, directors have been said not to be under a duty to disclose facts
that appear upon the corporation's books. See SmvmNs, P=uvA~r CoaoRArioNs 697 (2d
ed. 1949).
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Most persons-in fact the great majority-engaged in the securi-
ties business in the United States combine the functions of broker
and dealer, and from this hybrid status of broker-dealer stem many
conflicts. A broker-dealer may serve a given customer in one trans-
action as a broker and in another as a dealer. He may act as a
broker in relation to some customers, and as a dealer in relation to
others. He may have transactions with non-customers in his business
as a dealer, while at the same time engaging in similar transactions
as an agent for customers of his brokerage business. Misunderstand-
ings and disputes are stimulated by this overlapping of functions and
the common-law rules of principal and agent do not present an effective
antidote.
B. State Legislation
Every state except Nevada has enacted some form of legislation
regulating or affecting the sale of securities. Such statutes, collectively
known as "Blue Sky" laws, are of three major types. Although the
regulatory device adopted by a specific legislature often combines
the features of several types, and a given state may frequently effect
drastic changes in its legislation.'
First, there are licensing statutes. Practically all states require
brokers, dealers, securities salesmen and investment counselors to
obtain licenses from the state, or at least to register with the state.
These laws are based upon the theory that honest brokers will not
engage in dishonest practices and that honest dealers will not trade
in dishonest securities. In applying for a license the broker-dealer is
required to supply information as to his business operations and
financial status upon the basis of which a designated official is sup-
posedly enabled to form a judgment as to the applicant's professional
standing.
Secondly, there are registration statutes. About forty states
provide for the registration of securities with a regulatory commission
before they may lawfully be sold or offered for sale. Each state
administrative agency is empowered to deny or to revoke registration
if in its judgment the issue does not conform to statutory standards
designed to curtail the sale of fraudulent or unsound securities. The
impact of these laws is greatly diminished by provision for numerous
exemptions. The great majority of states exempt securities in the
following categories: securities of national and state banks, securities of
building and loan associations, commercial paper issued in the ordinary
8. The Wisconsin law, for example, has been completely re-written at least four
times.
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course of business, securities of corporations organized under acts
of Congress, securities of foreign governments, isolated sales by owner
or for owner's account, judicial sales, securities of non-profit organiza-
tions, securities issued by political subdivisions of states, securities of
public utilities under federal or state control, real property mortgage
bonds or notes, sales of securities to banks, brokers, dealers, corpo-
rations, insurance companies, savings institutions or trust companies,
stock dividends to security holders, securities of trust companies, and
securities of the United States, states, or territories. A dozen or
more states exempt securities issued by cooperative associations,
domestic corporations, insurance companies, personal property mort-
gage bonds or notes, as well as securities issued upon merger or con-
solidation or pursuant to stock subscriptions when no commissions
were paid nor expenses incurred prior to incorporation.
Thirdly, there are fraud statutes. Considered generally, "Blue
Sky" laws provide five types of remedies for fraudulent practices in
connection with the sale of securities: (1) prosecution resulting in fine
and/or imprisonment, (2) injunction, (3) stop order, (4) suspension
or revocation of license or registration, and (5) civil liability. The
former Delaware statute9 merely authorized the Attorney General to
seek injunctions against those engaging in the fraudulent sale or ex-
change of securities. Unless at least coupled with a provision for
investigation or criminal prosecution, such a statute has little or no
remedial value.
The task of administering "Blue Sky" laws is entrusted in most
states not to a separate securities commission but to some other state
agency that performs this work only as a subsidiary function. In such
states, more likely than not, attorneys general, corporation commis-
sioners, insurance commissioners or comparable administrative officials
are those who administer the laws. The 1938 report of the State
Legislation Committee of the Investment Bankers Association contains
this statement:
"Records disclose that the average tenure in office by a
securities commissioner is but little more than two years. This,
of course, is occasioned by the exigencies of our political system
and the failure to place such highly specialized administrative
positions on the merit system. The success of any securities law,
both as to workability and effectiveness, depends almost wholly
upon its administration, and administration is dependent upon
experience as well as ability. It all too frequently happens that
about the time the requisite experience is acquired, the turn of the
9. SEE Loss, SECUmTIES REGULATION 32 (Supp. 1955).
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political wheel of fortune forces a change. As a consequence, both
the investor and legitimate industry are liable to suffer for a
time." 10
On the whole, "Blue Sky" laws have proved to be of limited effectiveness
in counteracting malpractices in the distribution and sale of securities.
This can be ascribed in large measure to the fact that these statutes,
almost without exception, are based upon a philosophy of control rather
than disclosure. The state agency undertakes to decide whether a
given security conforms to specific statutory standards which typically
are very broad. Hence the state agency has, in effect, discretion to
determine whether or not a security is so unsound that it should not be
sold within the state. This excessive governmental invasion of the
free enterprise system, like the eighteenth amendment, encourages
evasion and subterfuge, thus causing administration and enforcement
of the law to be impracticable. Moreover, the generous and ofttimes
illogical exemptions that are to be found in many of the "Blue Sky"
laws promote confusion, dissatisfaction and general disrespect for
the statute, thereby complicating the problem of enforcement. Further-
more, one who seeks to avoid impact with the "Blue Sky" law of a
given state has no great difficulty in achieving this result by merely
remaining physically outside of that state and conducting operations
within the state solely through media of interstate commerce. Not
being a "fugitive," he is in little danger of extradition. Finally, it
should be noted that many state legislatures have been niggardly in
appropriating funds for the administration and enforcement of the law,
and inadequate budgets and personnel have hopelessly handicapped
state agencies in the performance of their allotted tasks.
III. FEDERAL REGULATION OF MISREPRESENTATION IN OVER-THE-
COUNTER TRANSACTIONS
Misrepresentation is as old as barter, and in the sale of any kind
of property it is the most common form of misconduct. To falsify in
the hope of thereby achieving more favorable terms is a temptation
that besets both buyers and sellers, although in the sale of securities
the chief offender is the seller. Sales of securities over the counter
afford more scope for misrepresentation than those consummated
through a stock exchange because over-the-counter transactions in-
volve direct dealings between the principals or their agents and are
less exposed to public scrutiny.
10. STATE LEGISLATION CoMMiTTE, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-
SEVENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE INVESTMENT BAxKEs ASSOCIATION OF
AmWncA 305 (1938).
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In over-the-counter trading, a customer may buy from or sell to
a dealer directly or through the medium of a broker or he may, with
a broker as his agent, buy from or sell to a non-dealer who may or
may not be represented by a broker. Ordinarily, misrepresentation
in over-the-counter transactions is that of a broker or dealer and
not of a customer, but certain types of customers, such as promoters
seeking to unload watered stock, may deceive their own brokers.
Hence, if misrepresentation is involved in an over-the-counter trans-
action, the wrongdoer may be either a broker, a dealer, or a customer.
As heretofore indicated, common-law principles evolving from a
succession of judicial decisions have failed to provide purchasers
and sellers of securities with adequate protection against misrepre-
sentation. In general, the function of a court is to decide contro-
versies presented to it through the medium of established procedures
and concerning the interests of specific litigants. A court has little
independent investigating power, and although it may be mindful
of a broad public policy and desirous of preventing, as contrasted with
only correcting, a given abuse, it has very little power to innovate;
hence such prophylactic rules as it may devise will seldom prove to
be completely effective. This is particularly true in the realm of fraud
and kindred forms of misconduct. The malpractices of unscrupulous
promoters and dealers in securities are rarely brought to the attention
of a court until after the event, and the common-law remedies available
to the court after the horse has been stolen do not always enable it to
return the steed, or its equivalent, and seldom to bolt the stable-door
against renewed chicanery. 1
A. The Mail Fraud Statute
Prior to the passage of the Securities Act of 1933, the Mail Fraud
Statute ' was the major source of the federal government's power to
curtail wrongdoing in the sale of securities. This statute has had
11. The significant development of administrative agencies in recent decades may
be traced, in large measure, to the expanded marketing of securities and Congress'
attempt to remedy malpractices with which the common law and state legislation had
proved incapable of dealing adequately. The stock crash of 1929-30 and resultant de-
pression precipitated a widespread demand for reform in stock trading, both on the
exchanges and over the counter.
12. In its present form this statute provides substantially as follows: "Whoever,
having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtain-
ing money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, or to sell . . . any . . . security or other article . . . for the purpose of ex-
ecuting such scheme or artifice or attempting to do so, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or de-
livered by the Post Office Department . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1952).
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only limited effectiveness in combatting fraudulent practices in securities
transactions. Its sanctions are confined to criminal proceedings, and
the clever swindler has been able readily to stay beyond its reach, if
only by completely avoiding the use of the mails. Moreover, the
cumbersome procedure for enforcement of the Mail Fraud Statute
enables many real offenders to go unpunished.
B. The SEC Statutes
In 1920 Co ngress had added section 20a to the Interstate Com-
merce Act,18 making it unlawful for any carrier by railroad to issue
securities without the authorization of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, but the Securities Act of 1933 -4 was the first permanent
federal securities legislation of general application. It represents a
middle of the road policy of full disclosure, rejecting two other opposing
philosophies: (1) the die-hard attitude that no preventive legislation
was feasible, and that Congress should go no further than to enact
an after-the-fact fraud type of statute, and (2) the pro-regulation
viewpoint that Congress should provide for federal incorporation of
interstate business, and pass legislation similar to the provisions of
many state "Blue Sky" laws requiring the registration of securities by
qualification.
In addition to the Securities Act of 1933 the Securities and Ex-
change Commission administers the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,11
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,"6 the Trust Inden-
ture At of 1939,1" the Investment Company Act of 1940,8 and the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940; '9 it also has some significant func-
tions with respect to corporate reorganization proceedings under
chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act."0 Moreover, the Commission
has express powers to make, alter and rescind rules and regulations
deemed by it to be necessary to enable it to carry out the purposes of
the several statutes. Many of the rules thus promulgated have a
practical significance comparable to that of the statutory provisions
themselves.
13. 41 STAr. 493 (1920), 49 U.S.C. § 20(a) (1952).
14. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §77(a) (1952).
15. 48 STAr. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1952).
16. 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1952).
17. 53 STAT. 1149 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1952).
18. 54 STAT. 789 (1940), 11 U.S.C. §§ 72, 107 (1952), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80(a)-(1) to
80(a)-(52) (1952).
19. 54 STAT. 847 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80(b) (1952).
20. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1952).
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1. Disclosure Provisions
One who has knowledge of the actual facts is difficult to mislead
by a false representation as to such facts, and it is at least less likely
that misrepresentation will be attempted if the facts are known to be
readily available. Consequently, to the extent that the federal securities
laws require disclosure and widespread dissemination of information
relevant to the worth of securities traded over the counter, they
minimize the likelihood of effective misrepresentation in such trans-
actions. Through this legislation Congress sought in two major
respects to induce disclosure of detailed information as to specific
securities.
Section 5 of the Securities Act provides that no person may law-
fully sell or deliver a security, not exempt under sections 3 and 4,
through the use of the mails or in interstate commerce unless a regis-
tration statement has been filed with the SEC and is in effect, and
a prospectus meeting the requirements of section 10 is delivered to
the purchaser.?' Reference to the definition and exemption sections of
the act reveals that section 5, despite its all-embracing language, is
confined essentially to the issuing and underwriting of new securities.
In short, it relates primarily2 2 to the original distribution of a security
issue and not to subsequent trading in such securities. Nevertheless,
when the distribution is complete, and trading in the securities occurs
on a stock exchange or over the counter or both, the highly detailed
information in the registration statement, being available to investors
and their professional advisers, tends to dissuade those who might
otherwise be tempted to misrepresent. Moreover, the information
contained in a registration statement may have significance with respect
to other outstanding classes of securities of the issuer.
The required information is both financial and non-financial.
Typical items are: a balance sheet as of a date not more than ninety
days before filing, certified profit and loss statements for the last three
fiscal years, and similar financial statements of any business that is to
be bought in whole or in part with any portion of the proceeds of the
issue, copies of the issuer's articles of incorporation and by-laws, the
names and addresses of all directors, principal officers, promoters,
underwriters and ten per cent shareholders, together with the amount
of securities they hold or have manifested an intention to acquire, the
21. 48 STAT. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1952).
22. Section 4 of the Securities Act, as amended in 1954, which defines exempted
transactions, causes some of the provisions of § 5 to be applicable to transactions in reg-
istered securities by a "dealer" within forty days of the effective date of the registra-
tion statement affecting such securities. 68 STAT. 684 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77(d) (Supp.
III, 1954).
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general character of the issuer's business, copies of the agreements
or indentures underlying any securities offered or to be offered, the
proposed public offering price, underwriters' commissions or discounts
and other expenses of the offering, the estimated net proceeds of the
issue, the purpose of the issue, remuneration of officers and directors,
payments made within the preceding two years, or to be made, to
promoters, property to be acquired through the proceeds of the sale
and the interest of any director or officer or ten-percenter in such
property, and the financial history of the issuer and of any business to
be acquired through the proceeds of the issue.
By virtue of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act the
Commission has authority to require a limited number of issuers to
keep the information set forth in their registration statements up to
date by filing current and annual reports.'
The other major provision promoting disclosure of detailed infor-
mation as to specific securities is to be found in the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Section 12(a) of that statute declares that "It shall be
unlawful for any member, broker or dealer to effect any transaction
in any security (other than an exempted security) on a national
securities exchange unless a registration is effective as to such security
for such exchange in accordance with the provisions of this title, and
the rules and regulations thereunder." 24 The fact that a security
when issued, may have been registered with the SEC under section
5 of the Securities Act does not obviate the necessity of complying
with section 12(a) of the Exchange Act, although it does facilitate
compliance.
Although under section 12(b) duplicate originals must be filed
with the SEC, the theory of the section is that to achieve registration
of a security on a national exchange the issuer shall file with the
exchange an application for listing, and the exchange may at its dis-
cretion accept or reject the application, subject to the qualification that
the exchange may not validly accept an application unless it conforms
to the registration procedures prescribed by the Commission. These
procedures are set forth in subsections (b), (c) and (d) of section 12
and regulation X-12B.' The information which is required of the
issuer for registration under section 12 is very similar to that required
for registration under section 5 of the Securities Act. Section 13 of
the Exchange Act requires the issuer to keep this information up
to date by filing current and annual reports on forms prescribed by
23. 48 STAT. 894 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (1952).
24. 48 STAT. 892 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(1) (1952).
25. Ibid.
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the Commission,"0 and failure to comply with this requirement may
result in the security being "de-listed" by the Commission pursuant
to section 19(a) (2) of the Exchange Act.27
The efforts of Congress to combat misrepresentation in the sale
of securities by enforced disclosure of information are not confined
to the above-mentioned sections of the Securities Act and the Securities
Exchange Act. There are comparable provisions in the Investment
Company Act s and in the Public Utility Holding Company Act.'
Moreover, section 14(a) of the Exchange Act gives the Commission
broad rule-making power with respect to the solicitation of proxies
"in respect to any security (other than an exempted security) regis-
tered on any national securities exchange." " The rules promulgated
by the Commission are designated as regulation X-14." They
require, inter alia, that proxy solicitations by management in connection
with meetings for the election of directors must be accompanied or
preceded by an adequate annual report of the company for the lasi
fiscal year. Similar financial statements are required to be included
with the proxy solicitation in conjunction with the authorization,
issuance, modification or exchange of securities, or a merger or
consolidation.
Although the information required to be disclosed in proxy
literature is not generally related to a specific security, nevertheless the
data are of value to investors in arming them against misrepresenta-
tions. Moreover, this information goes directly to security holders,
whereas the information in registration statements and similar in-
struments gets to investors after termination of the public offering
only if they seek it out. The general rule (subject to certain exceptions
with respect to confidential matter) is that documents filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission are available to the public, and
photocopies may be purchased from the Commission.
2. General Anti-Fraud Provisions
Fortunately, however, the congressional approach to the problem
of misrepresentation in the sale of securities is not confined to the
disclosure principle. Misrepresentation occurring willfully, or resulting
from gross carelessness as to truth, is a species of fraud. In the SEC
26. 48 STAT. 894 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (1952).
27. 48 STAT. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(s) (1952).
28. 54 STAT. 803, 838 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80(a)-(8), 80(a)-(30) (1952).
29. 49 STAT. 812, 827 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79(e), 79(m) (1952).
30. 48 STAT. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1952).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1939).
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statutes there are three general anti-fraud provisions that may be a
basis for injunctive or administrative action or criminal prosecution,
or that may entitle defrauded buyers or sellers of securities to maintain
civil suits for rescission or damages. These are section 17(a) of the
Securities Act, rule X-10B-5 ' under section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act,3 4 and section 15(c) (1) of the latter Act' (amplified by rule
X-15C-2 " thereunder) .
a. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act
This section enumerates three distinct offenses:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the sale of any secu-
rities by the use of any means or instrument of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails,
directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any un-
true statement of a material fact or any omission to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon the purchaser." 3
One of the weaknesses of section 17(a) is that it is applicable by
its terms only to sellers of securities, and while it is arguable that it
is also applicable to frauds by purchasers, the fact is that the SEC
has never sought to apply it to purchasers.
b. Rule X-1OB-5
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act reads as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
32. 48 STAT. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1952).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (Cum. Supp. 1944).
34. 48 STAT. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1952).
35. 52 STAT. 1075 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78(o) (1952).
36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.cl-2 (Supp. 1940).
37. In addition, § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act makes it unlawful for any
registered adviser, by use of the mails or interstate facilities, directly or indirectly,
"(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud any client or prospective
client; (2) to engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which operates
as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client." 54 STAT. 852 (1940), 15
U.S.C. § 80(b)-(6) (1952).
38. 48 STAT. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(q) (1952).
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or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities ex-
change-
(b) To use or employ in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security registered on a national securities ex-
change or any security not so registered any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors." "
This section expressly applies to over-the-counter as well as to
stock exchange transactions, to purchasers as well as sellers of securities,
and is not limited, as is section 15(c) (1), to transactions by brokers
and dealers. But the section is not self-operative, for by its terms it
can be invoked only with respect to "such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe," and it was not until 1942 that the Com-
mission adopted the now famous rule X-10B-5. This rule, which
imports the prohibitions of section 17(a) of the Securities Act into
the Exchange Act, provides as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce,
or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities ex-
change,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security." 40
Since its adoption rule X-10B-5 has increasingly been relied upon
as the basis for civil actions for rescission or damages, as well as for
other forms of litigation.
c. Section 15(c) (1) of the Exchange Act
This section is confined to over-the-counter transactions and
affects only brokers and dealers. It reads as follows:
"No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any
39. 17 C.F.R1 § 240.10b-5 (Cum. Supp. 1944); 48 STAr. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(q) (1952).
40. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (Cum. Supp. 1944).
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transaction in, or to induce the purchase or sale of, any security
(other than commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial
bills) otherwise than on a national securities exchange, by means
of any manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or
contrivance. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this
subsection, by rules and regulations define such devices or con-
trivances as are manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudu-
lent." 41
Despite the concluding authorization to the Commission to promul-
gate rules and regulations, this section differs from section 10(b) in
that its first sentence is self-operative; but it is like section 10(b) in
that it relates to fraudulent purchasers as well as sellers of securities.
3. Sanctions Available to the Commission
One of the reasons that the foregoing anti-fraud sections are more
effective than the Mail Fraud Statute is that Congress has given the
SEC the long-range weapon of injunction with which to combat
threatened or continuing violations of the various acts administered
by it. Section 20 (b) of the Securities Act provides as follows:
"Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person
is engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices which
constitute or will constitute a violation of the provisions of this
title, or of any rule or regulation prescribed under authority
thereof, it may in its discretion bring an action in any district
court of the United States, United States court of any Territory,
or the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, to enjoin such
acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or
temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without
bond. . " 4
There are comparable provisions in the Exchange Act,4 the
Public Utility Holding Company Act,4 4 the Trust Indenture Act,45
the Investment Company Act,4" and the Investment Advisers Act.47
Moreover, all of the SEC statutes make it a criminal offense "wilfully"
to violate any of their provisions, or any of the Commission's rules
thereunder 4 (except, as to the rules of the Investment Advisers Act).
41. 52 STAT. 1075 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (c) (1) (1952).
42. 48 STAT. 86 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(t) (1952).
43. 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1952).
44. 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1952).
45. 53 STAT. 1149 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1952).
46. 54 STAT. 789 (1940), 11 U.S.C. §§ 72, 107 (1952); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80(a)-(1) to
80(a)-(52) (1952).
47. 54 STAT. 847 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80(b) (1952).
48. 48 STAT. 87 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (x) (1952); 48 STAT. 904 (1934), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78(ff) (1952).
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4. Civil Liabilities
In addition to injunction and criminal prosecution, another form
of sanction for the anti-fraud statutes is that of civil liability, i.e., a
private suit by the defrauded party against the wrongdoer for rescis-
sion or damages. Such suits, as noted above, have frequently been
based upon rule X-10B-5, although neither this rule nor section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act, which it implements, expressly authorize such
litigation. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act does, however,
specifically create civil liability on the part of a defrauding seller. This
section reads as follows:
"Any person who sells a security (whether or not exempted
by the provisions of section 3, other than paragraph (2) of sub-
section (a) thereof), by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of
the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which
includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission),
and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known,
of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person pur-
chasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the con-
sideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the
amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such
security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security." 19
To the defrauded purchaser of securities this statute is in several
respects an improvement over the common-law action of rescission.
In the first place, he does not have to prove that he actually relied upon
the misrepresentation, although he must prove unawareness of the
truth. Secondly, tender back of the purchased security is not a sine
qua non of his statutory cause of action, and if he has sold the security,
he may nevertheless sue for the monetary equivalent of the rescission,
i.e., damages. Thirdly, he may maintain his action in the federal courts
without a requirement of diversity of citizenship or of a jurisdictional
amount, and without being deprived of his right, in the alternative, to
maintain a state court action.
A broker guilty of misrepresentation may be sued under section
12(2), for the statutory language "any person who sells a security"
applies not only to the seller but also to those who represent him.
49. 48 STAT. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(i) (1952).
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In the Exchange Act there are two civil liability sections appli-
cable to misrepresentations. Section 9(a) (4) declares it to be unlaw-
ful for any person, including a dealer or broker, knowingly to make a
false or misleading statement as to any security registered on a
national securities exchange, for the purpose of inducing the purchase
or sale of such security,50 and section 9(3) gives any person injured
thereby a right to sue in law or in equity in any court of competent juris-
diction to recover the damages resulting therefrom."' The period of
limitations set forth in this section is one year after discovery and three
years after the violation. Section 18 provides, in effect, that any
person, who shall have purchased or sold a security in reliance upon
any false or misleading statement contained in an application, report
or document filed pursuant to the Exchange Act, or any rule or regula-
tion thereunder, shall have a cause of action for resulting damages
against anyone responsible for the misrepresentation.52 Such suit may
be at law or in equity and may be brought in any court of competent
jurisdiction. The statutory period of limitations is one year from
discovery and three years after the cause of action accrued.
5. Implied Liability
The presence or absence of an express statutory provision for
rescission or damage suits against those who violate SEC legislation
has been less important during recent years because of the judicial
development of a far-reaching doctrine. Section 29(b) of the Ex-
change Act stipulates, in effect, that all contracts in violation of the
statute or any rule thereunder are "void" as to the violator or any
other person who acquired any right under the contract with actual
knowledge of the violation.' Although this section does not spell out
the legal relations arising out of such a "void" transaction, the courts
have held that the language of section 29 (b) is sufficient not only for
a cause of action for rescission but also for companion causes of action
for money damages. This is a specific application of a common-law
doctrine, which has been finding increasing favor with the judiciary,
to the general effect that a private action may be brought for violation
of a statute, if the interest invaded is one which the statute is intended
to protect.54
50. 48 STAT. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(i) (1952).
51. Ibid.
52. 48 STAT. 897 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(r) (1952).
53. 48 STAT. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(cc) (1952).
54. One of the most important applications of this doctrine to securities transac-
tions occurred in the case of Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.
Pa. 1946). It will be recalled that there is no express provision for civil liability either
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IV. FEDERAL REGULATION OF MANIPULATION IN OVER-THE-
COUNTER TRANSACTIONS
Manipulation is the process of artificially causing the price of one
or more securities to be above or below that which otherwise would
result from the normal operation of supply and demand. The methods
of manipulators are legion but certain patterns frequently emerge.
Manipulation is seldom encountered today, but when attempted
it is usually a pool operation. First, the pool selects a stock to which
public attention may easily be directed by rumors of merger, stock
split-up, new discoveries, government contracts, etc. Then, such
rumors are deliberately spread through the media of touting, tip-sheets,
financial publications, radio commentators and newspaper columnists
susceptible to bribery, and similar channels. Sometimes the pool will
first depress the price of the stock to be manipulated by selling short on
a scale down accompanied by unfavorable rumors, in order to acquire
a supply of the stock at a low price level from which to start the
artificial stimulation. The pool may resort to options to buy the stock
at a fixed price or at graduated prices close to the market.
Next the appearance of active trading is created. Brokers and
dealers are sent market letters calculated to interest them and their
customers in the stock in question. With the aid of professional pub-
licity agents, supposedly unbiased market analyses of the stock are
widely circulated. A program of active trading by the members of
the pool is launched.
When through this unrealistic activity the price of the stock has
risen substantially, the pool will circumspectly dispose of its holdings.
This will be accomplished by a continuation of active trading in the
stock with a preponderance of sales by the pool. Even after the, pool
has profitably liquidated its long position, it may continue active trad-
ing during which it effects a volume of short sales. It will then stop
trading and with the withdrawal of the support a sudden decline in the
price of the stock will probably occur, enabling the pool to cover its
short sales at a low price, thus profiting both ways from the
manipulation.
in § 10(b) of the Exchange Act or in rule X-10B-5, and in this case the federal court
had jurisdiction only if the Exchange Act was applicable. The court, however, upheld
the plaintiffs' right of action against the defendants saying that "the disregard of the
command of a statute is a wrongful act and a tort," and "in view of the general pur-
pose of the Act, the mere omission of an express provision for civil liability is not
sufficient to negative what the general law implies." Many courts have followed this
doctrine and none have reached a contrary result under rule X-10B-5. But see Howard
v. Furst, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), 105 U. PA. L. REv. 1016. 70 HAxv. L. REv. 493
(1957), in which the court held a civil remedy was not implied under section 14(a)
for violation of the proxy rules.
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Although manipulation is facilitated by the mechanics of the stock
exchange, it is by no means confined to stock exchange transactions.
The over-the-counter market has frequently been the scene of manipu-
lative practices, and to the extent that listed securities are traded over
the counter, stock exchange manipulations can have a direct impact
upon over-the-counter traders. During 1929 alone, members of the
New York Stock Exchange participated in pool operations involving
105 listed issues, and during the period 1929-1933 pool profits were
shared by 175 member firms."' The effect of manipulation may be
devastating upon small investors, especially those poorly financed or
trading on a relatively narrow margin. Furthermore, manipulation
is a social evil in that it undermines public confidence in the rela-
tionship between market prices and market values.
Elimination of manipulation was a major concern of Congress in
enacting the program of federal securities legislation, and happily this
has been one of the most successful portions of the program. As the
terms of over-the-counter transactions in listed securities obviously
can be affected by stock exchange manipulations, the statutory regu-
lations with respect to manipulation on the stock exchange as well as
over the counter will be examined.
A. Wash Sales and Matched Orders
The statutory attack upon manipulation of securities prices is
spearheaded by sections 9 and 10 of the Exchange Act. Section 9
makes it illegal to effect any wash sale (i.e., one in which the same
party is both buyer and seller) or matched order (i.e., an order placed
with knowledge that a confederate will place a corresponding order
to buy or sell the same security at the same time and price)."' The
success of a pool operation to manipulate the price of a security upward
depends upon the extent to which an increased demand for the security
can be artificially stimulated. The purpose of wash sales and matched
orders through an exchange is to cause the ticker tape and newspaper
quotations to record an appearance of activity in the security, and
thus to lead the unwary investor to act on the belief that others regard
the security as underpriced. If the pool is seeking to manipulate the
price downward, comparable activities may ensue. There may be
non-manipulative wash sales or matched orders (e.g., in the hope of
achieving a tax benefit), but the overwhelming preponderance of such
transactions are associated with planned securities manipulations, and
55. S. R i,. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1934).
56. 48 STAT. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1952).
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the resulting harm from such machinations is so great that Congress
felt justified in outlawing them.
The statutory prohibitions and Commission regulations with re-
spect to manipulation are supported by the same sanctions as those
discussed in the preceding section on misrepresentation, i.e., injunctive,
administrative and criminal proceedings, and civil liability.
B. Dissemination of False and Misleading Information
In the preceding section the regulation of misrepresentation in
general was considered. Misrepresentation is a favorite device of those
seeking to manipulate securities prices, and from that standpoint it will
be discussed in the present section. Section 9(a) (3) of the Exchange
Act declares it to be unlawful for
a dealer or broker, or other person selling or offering
for sale or purchasing or offering to purchase the security, to induce
the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national secu-
rities exchange by the circulation or dissemination in the ordinary
course of business of information to the effect that the price of
any such security will or is likely to rise or fall because of market
operations of any one or more persons conducted for the purpose
of raising or depressing the price of such security." 57
Section 9(a) (5) makes it unlawful for anyone, for a considera-
tion, to engage in the activities forbidden in section 9 (a) (3).8
Taken together the foregoing two subsections prohibit a pool
operator from "touting" a security or hiring someone to do his "tout-
ing" for him. In connection with manipulative operations it was a
common practice for the pool to employ publicity agents and publishers
of "market services" and tipster sheets to give slanted opinions while
purporting to be unbiased.
Section 17(b) of the Securities Act makes it unlawful for anyone,
for a consideration received from an issuer, underwriter or dealer, to
circulate information about a security without disclosing the receipt of
such consideration; 5" and section 9(a) (4) of the Exchange Act con-
tains a general prohibition against any person knowingly making a
false or misleading statement concerning a security registered on a
national securities exchange for the purpose of inducing its purchase
or sale.Y0
57. 48 STAT. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (3) (1952).
58. 48 STAT. 890 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (5) (1952).
59. 48 STAT. 85 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (1952).
60. 48 STAT. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (4) (1952).
1957]
22 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
C. Manipulative Pool Operations
Apart from the use of a particular device, manipulative operations
are in general prohibited by section 9(a) (2) of the Exchange Act,
which declares it to be unlawful "To effect, alone or with one or more
other persons, a series of transactions in any security registered on a
national securities exchange creating actual or apparent active trading
in such security, or raising or depressing the price of such security,
for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by
others." 0'
By its express terms section 9 (a) of the Exchange Act relates only
to securities registered on a national securities exchange, and therefore
this section does not prohibit manipulative practices on the over-the-
counter market with respect to unlisted securities. But to somie extent
section 15(c) (1) of the Exchange Act plugs this gap: This section
declares it to be unlawful for any broker or dealer to induce the pur-
chase or sale of any security "otherwise than on a national securities
exchange" by means of any manipulative device. 2 This section is con-
fined to brokers and dealers, but inasmuch, as, by definition, an over-
the-counter transaction always involves a broker or dealer, manipula-
tive practices on the over-the-counter market almost of necessity result
in a violation of the section. As a matter of fact, the Commission has
often ruled that conduct which would be a violation of section 9 (a) (2)
in the case of a listed security is a violation of section 15(c) (1) if
effected in an unregistered security.
An administrative division of the SEC follows the price move-
ments of about 3,500 securities traded on the exchanges and about
5,000 of the most active over-the-counter securities; hundreds of secu-
rities are kept under special scrutiny when public offerings of related
securities are pending. Thus the Commission is frequently able to nip
in the bud manipulative activities which otherwise might be conducted
for the purpose of "facilitating" the new offering.
D. Puts and Calls
A put is a negotiable document giving the holder the right to sell
to the maker a given security at a stated price within a specified period
of time; a call gives the holder a converse right to buy. A "spread"
or "straddle" is a similar option to buy or sell or both. The holder of
a put hopes that the market price will decline so that he can buy the
security at less than the fixed price at which he holds a selling option,
61. 48 STAT. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (2) (1952).
62. 48 STAr. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 780(c) (1) (1952).
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and the holder of a call will profit if the market price advances so that
he may sell the security at a price greater than that at which he has
an option to buy. These instruments may be legitimately acquired as
a hedge against adverse future market movements or as an inexpensive
form of speculation. But they may also serve as aids to manipulative
pool operations, for they enable the manipulators to enter the market
at a minimum of risk with a large potential supply of the security to
be manipulated.
Because of possible legitimate uses of puts, calls and other secu-
rities options, Congress did not ban these devices, but in section 9(b)
and (c) of the Exchange Act it was declared to be unlawful, through
the facilities of a national securities exchange, to acquire any interest
in or to guarantee performance of any put, call, straddle, etc., in con-
travention of rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission.'
In its early years the Commission studied proposed rules to govern
trading practices and other matters concerning puts and calls, but it
has never adopted any rules on this subject, apparently preferring to
combat these devices, if used for manipulative purposes, by resort to
its other anti-manipulation powers.
E. Short Sales and Stop-Loss Orders
Section 10 (a) makes it unlawful for any person "to effect a short
sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order in connection with the
purchase or sale, of any security registered on a national securities
exchange, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe. . .. " 64
A short sale occurs when a broker carries out a customer's order
to sell a given security for the customer's account and to make delivery
by borrowing the security for the customer. Usually the seller's
broker borrows the security from another broker and deposits with the
latter a dollar amount equal to the market value of the stock at the time
it is borrowed. The customer hopes that the market price will there-
after decrease, and that he can profit by purchasing stock with which
to cover his loan at a price lower than that which he received when the
short sale was executed. If instead the market rises, the customer
will suffer a corresponding loss when he buys stock with which to
repay the loan.
There are those who maintain that the stock market derives some
economic benefit from the short sale; others insist that short-selling is
mainly a speculative device and that it serves few useful economic func-
63. 48 STAT. 890 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78i(b)-(c) (1952).
64. 48 STAT. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (a) (1952).
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tions. Without doubt, however, as a tool of those seeking by manipula-
tion to depress the market in a given security, short sales can result
in positive harm. So strenuous was the controversy over the merits
of short-selling that Congress decided not to ban this practice, but to
delegate to the Commission power upon investigation to make appro-
priate rules and regulations.
During 1937 the Commission made a thorough study of short
selling rules as a result of which it prescribed a comprehensive system
of regulations, the heart of which is rule X-10A-1 (a)."' That rule
now permits short sales at (rather than above) the last "regular way"
sale price if that price was itself higher than the last different "regular
way" price that preceded it. On the New York Stock Exchange a
'"regular way" sale is one which is made for delivery on the third full
business day following the day of the transaction. There are a number
of exemptions among which are odd-lot sales. In consequence of the
Commission's regulations, short-selling on a scale-down, for the
purpose of depressing the market price of a security, is effectively
prohibited."o
A stop-loss order is a direction given by a customer to his broker
to buy (or to sell) a given security if the market price rises (or de-
clines) a stipulated number of points, i.e., when a transaction occurs
at the designated price. If the market reaches the stated price, the
stop-loss order becomes an order to buy (or to sell) at the market and
the broker must promptly execute the order at the best price obtainable.
Stop-loss orders to buy will minimize the losses of those who have
sold short if the market rises, and stop-loss orders to sell will enable
those who have a long position to limit loss or protect profit in the
event of a market decline.
Stop-loss orders are not exactly a manipulative device, but their
existence may be a considerable aid to pool operators, especially if the
pool includes a "specialist" 17 in the security to be manipulated. If
there is a large volume of stop-loss orders at or near the same price, the
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (1939).
66. Unfortunately, there is no explicit safeguard with respect to over-the-counter
dealings in unlisted securities against the impact of short sales on a down scale. Due to
differences in over-the-counter and exchange transactions, a different formula for reg-
ulation would have to be devised for short selling over the counter.
67. At each stock exchange trading post there is a member who has been granted
permission by the exchange to "specialize" in a particular stock or stocks traded at that
post, and who remains constantly at the post during trading hours. Other brokers who
have limited orders, i.e., not at the market but at a fixed price, to buy or to sell a full
lot (usually 100 shares) incline to place such orders with the appropriate specialist to
be filled when the market reaches the customer's stated price. The specialist keeps a
book in which such orders are recorded in accordance with the stated price. "Stop
loss" orders, being a form of limited order, are likewise generally executed through a
specialist, if and when the occasion arises.
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market may be flooded with selling offers when the security reaches
this price. Since these orders must be executed at the best price obtain-
able, even though this is substantially below the price stipulated in the
stop-loss order, a precipitous price decline may result. If a "bear"
pool can learn from a specialist the level of such a volume of stop-loss
orders, it can drive the price down to this level by short sales, and then
the desired further decline will follow automatically.
Since stop-loss orders have economic justification and their aid to
manipulators is circumstantial, Congress decided not to prohibit their
use, but to leave this matter also to Commission regulation. To date,
however, the Commission has issued no regulations on this subject
and, in view of the general acceptance of the legitimacy of stop-loss
orders, the likelihood that the Commission will alter its present course
is remote.
F. Manipulative Devices
Section 10(b) declares it to be unlawful for any person, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security, listed or unlisted, to
employ "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in con-
travention of Commission rules." Pursuant to this authorization the
Commission has adopted five anti-fraud rules (one of which it subse-
quently repealed) implementing this section. No one of these rules
relates exclusively to manipulation, but since manipulation is a species
of fraud, the general anti-fraud sections and rules, heretofore discussed
in connection with the topic of misrepresentation, are applicable and
have been applied to manipulative practices on the over-the-counter
market as well as on stock exchanges.
G. Stabilization
A form of securities manipulation that has provoked considerable
controversy is known as "stabilization." This occurs most frequently
during the period of flotation of a new issue, and usually consists of
purchases of the security being distributed for the account of the under-
writing syndicate in order to maintain the initial offering price or to
prevent a decline. A brief resum6 of investment banking practices will
contribute to an understanding of the stabilization problem.
Many corporations that seek additional capital by marketing their
securities directly to the public, contract for these services with an
investment banker or underwriter. This contract contains the agreed
terms of the issue as well as the approximate price to the issuer and the
"spread" (i.e., the difference between the price realized by the issuer
68. 48 STAT. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1952).
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and the price charged to the public by the underwriter). The originat-
ing underwriter then forms an underwriting syndicate, the other mem-
bers of which proportionately share the risk and the potential profit.
The members of the underwriting group sell at least half of the issue
to their own customers, and the balance is sold for their account by a
selling group which they form and with whom they split commissions
on this latter amount of the total issue. Shortly before the effective
date of the registration statement, which the originator has previously
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the actual con-
tract between the issuer and the originator is signed, and the offering
price is decided upon and communicated to the SEC by way of an
amendment to the registration statement, which the Commission al-
most invariably accepts.
Sound public demand for a security is based upon its known merits
and upon the record of the issuer. There may, however, be a time lag
between the offering of an issue at a stated price and public awareness
of its worth, during which period the market price may sag. But the
underwriters, if they have already provided the issuing corporation with
the capital represented by the price to them, can ill afford to have this
amount of their assets immobilized while they wait for the public to
develop a realization that the offering price is fair and reasonable. So
they at times purchase blocks of the very issue they are trying to sell,
in order to create artificially an appearance of real demand at the offering
price, and thus to induce prompt public interest in purchasing the secu-
rities at that price. If the issue proves to be excessively unpopular, or
if it coincides with a general price decline, stabilization may prove to be
ineffective or the cost prohibitive.
Section 9(a) (6) of the Exchange Act declares it to be unlawful
for any person "to effect either alone or with one or more other per-
sons any series of transactions for the purchase and/or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange for the purpose of
pegging, fixing or stabilizing the price of such security in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe. . . ,
(Emphasis added.)
Section 9 applies only to securities listed or admitted to listed
privileges on a national exchange. Section 9(a) (6) specifically au-
thorizes the Commission to make rules distinguishing between
stabilization and unlawful manipulation with respect to such securities.
The only federal legislation relative to manipulation and stabilization
in over-the-counter transactions is to be found in the general anti-fraud
provisions of the Exchange Act, namely sections 10(b) and
69. 48 STAT. 890 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(6) (1952).
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15(c) (1)," together with section 17 of the Securities Act. With re-
spect to securities traded solely over the counter, these general anti-
fraud sections of the Exchange Act have been interpreted as having the
same impact upon fraud as section 9(a) has within its field. These
anti-fraud statutes proscribe "manipulative" practices, but do not con-
tain the express authorization to the Commission, found in section
9(a), to make rules permitting a limited use of stabilizing devices.71
But there is no evidence justifying the assumption that Congress in-
tended the law as to stabilization to be more lenient with respect to
stock exchange than over-the-counter transactions. Hence it would
seem that in interpreting the term "manipulative" in sections 10(b)
and 15(c) (1), the Commission has the power to exclude stabilizing
devices similar to those that it sanctions pursuant to its express rule-
making authority in section 9(a) (6) with respect to registered
securities. In both situations the congressional policy is to entrust to the
SEC the duty of distinguishing between stabilization and unlawful
manipulation. The Commission, however, has exercised this discre-
tion to only a very limited extent.
In 1939 the Commission adopted a rule under section 17(a) of
the Exchange Act requiring daily reports of stabilizing activities with
relation to any offering of an issue registered under the Securities Act.72
These reports are not open to public inspection. The Commission also
adopted rule 426 under the Securities Act, which requires that a state-
ment of intention to stabilize be conspicuously indicated on the front
cover page of the prospectus whenever the registrant or any of the un-
derwriters has reason to believe that the price of the security may be
stabilized.' In 1940 the Commission adopted regulation X-9A6-1
under section 9(a) (6) of the Exchange Act. 4 This regulation is
confined to primary or secondary distribution "at the market" (i.e., at
the price represented as being related to the market price and not ex-
pressed in terms of a fixed number of dollars) of securities of a class
already registered on a national securities exchange. With respect to
such "at the market" offerings, it precludes, inter alia, stabilization
70. 48 STAT. 891, 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j (b), 78o(c)(1) (1952).
71. "No broker or dealer shall ... effect any transaction in, or ... induce the
purchase or sale of, any security ... otherwise than on a national securities exchange,
by means of any manipulative, deceptive, or fraudulent device or contrivance. The Com-
mission shall . . .by rules and regulation define such devices or contrivances as are
manipulative, deceptive or otherwise fraudulent." 48 STAr. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(c) (1) (1952). Although the Commission has not defined "such devices or con-
trivances as are mentioned in the second sentence, the first sentence is self-operative.
See text following note 41 supra.
72. 48 STAT. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1952).
73. 17 C.F.R. § 230.426 (Supp. 1947).
74. 17 C.F.R. § 240.9a6-1 (Supp. 1940).
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purchases at a price above the last legitimate sale price on the desig-
nated exchange. The effect of this regulation has been the virtually
complete elimination of new offerings "at the market." The present
practice is to offer new issues at a fixed price, and stabilizing activities
in relation to "fixed price" offerings are subject to no special rules or
regulations of the Commission except the reporting rule and the dis-
closure rule mentioned above.'
The absence of a body of formal rules and regulations concerning
stabilization should not be construed as indicating that the Commis-
sion has drawn no lines between stabilization and manipulation. The
concern of the SEC and its staff with this subject has resulted in thou-
sands of rulings and opinions. In 1948, in summarizing its position as
to permissible stabilizing transactions in "fixed price" offerings, the
Commission publicly stated that
. . .stabilization for the sole purpose of preventing or
retarding a decline . . . does not of itself violate Section 9 (a) (2)
or any other section of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 so
long as the stabilizing purchases are effected at whichever is the
lower of two figures-(1) a bona fide independent market price
for the security being stabilized or (2) the public offering price
of the issue once the offering is made-and that within these re-
strictions there is no limit under existing statute and rules on the
amount of securities which may be purchased in the stabilizing
process." 7'
From this statement it clearly appears that transactions raising
the price of the security being offered, or creating excessive trading
therein, are not protected and are subject to the various anti-manipula-
tion procedures and penalties heretofore discussed.
If the security being stabilized is traded exclusively over the
counter, the propriety of the initial stabilizing bid is tested not by the
last sale (since there is no systematic reporting of transactions), but
by the highest truly independent bid in the market, i.e., the highest
price that a dealer has indicated his willingness to pay to another
dealer, which may or may not be the highest price appearing in the
current quotation sheet.
V. FEDERAL REGULATION OF NoN-DIsCLOSURE IN OVER-THE-
COUNTER TRANSACTIONS
Those who manage the affairs of a corporation or who own large
blocks of its stock often obtain advance information as to facts bearing
75. Since the promulgation in 1940 of regulation X-9A6-1, the Commission has
adopted no other regulation under § 9(a) (6) of the Exchange Act.
76. See 13 FD. RJo. 5659 (1948).
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upon the probable value of its securities. If this information is not
shared with others trading in these securities, the insiders are in a
position, through stock market transactions, to profit from their un-
disclosed knowledge. In time this practice became widespread, and it
produced one of the major problems confronting Congress in the
enactment of securities legislation, for, as pointed out heretofore, the
common law treated such inequitable conduct with extreme tolerance. 77
A. Report Requirement
Not unnaturally, Congress sought in its disclosure philosophy an
antidote for these "sure thing" speculations. Section 16(a) of the
Exchange Act provides that every officer or director of a corporation
with an equity security listed on a national exchange, or any person
who owns more than ten per cent of any registered equity security,
shall report to the Commission and to the exchange his holdings of
such securities, and shall further report each month any change in his
holdings.78  Section 3 (a) (11) defines "equity security" as "any stock
or similar security," or any right to obtain such securities, or any other
security which the Commission may deem it necessary, by such rules
and regulations as it may prescribe, to treat as an equity security.
79
Voting trust certificates and certificates of deposit of equity securities
are themselves deemed to be equity securities. If a corporation has
several classes of shares outstanding and one class is listed, section
16(a) applies as well to its other classes of shares.8" But if the cor-
poration has only a bond issue registered, this not being an equity secu-
rity, section 16(a) would not apply to any of the corporation's secu-
rities, even its common and preferred stocks.
The reports required by section 16(a) are made available to the
public both by the Commission and the exchange, and the Commission
summarizes the reports in a monthly pamphlet that is widely distributed.
For failure to comply with the requirements of section 16(a) the act
provides no specific penalty other than the general sanctions of criminal
prosecution and administrative injunction.
B. Loss of Short-Swing Profits
In addressing itself to the potential inequities of insider trading in
securities, Congress did not confine itself to the requirements of en-
forced disclosure. Seeking to discourage such practices by minimizing
the possibility of profit resulting therefrom, Congress created, in section
77. See text at note 7 supra.
78. 48 STAr. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1952).
79. 48 STAT. 884 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (11) (1952).
80. 48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1952).
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16(b) of the Exchange Act, a right in the issuing corporation to any
profits resulting to insiders from short-swing transactions in equity
securities. This section provides as follows:
"For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director,
or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit
realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and pur-
chase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an ex-
empted security) within any period of less than six months, unless
such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt
previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the
issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of the beneficial
owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of
holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the secu-
rity sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such
profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of com-
petent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security
of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer
shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after re-
quest or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but
no such suit shall be brought more than two years after such profit
was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the
time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the
security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the
Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not compre-
hended within the purpose of this subsection." 81
Since the intent of this section is prophylactic, i.e., to prevent
rather than to cure, an absence of actual unfair use of inside information
is no defense to the issuer's action to recover profits. On the other
hand, no matter how unfairly he may have profited from undisclosed
information, an insider is not liable under this section if the swing of
his transactions extended beyond the arbitrary six months limit estab-
lished by Congress. Although the profits with which section 16(b)
is concerned must arise out of transactions in equity securities, the sec-
tion applies to unlisted securities as well as those registered on an
exchange, and to transactions over the counter or even by private trans-
fer as well as on a stock exchange.
C. Prohibition of Short Sales by Insiders
In dealing with the problem of insider trading, Congress supple-
mented subsections 16(a) and (b) by prohibiting short sales by in-
siders. This provision is set forth in subsection 16(c) as follows:
81. 48 STA. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1952).
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"It shall be unlawful for any such beneficial owner, director,
or officer, directly or indirectly, to sell any equity security of
such issuer [other than an exempted security], if the person sell-
ing the security or his principal (1) does not own the security
sold, or (2) if owning the security, does not deliver it against such
sale within twenty days thereafter, or does not within five days
after such sale deposit it in the mails or other usual channels of
transportation; but no person shall be deemed to have violated this
subsection if he proves that notwithstanding the exercise of good
faith he was unable to make such delivery or deposit within such
time, or that to do so would cause him undue inconvenience or
expense." I
Clause (1) relates to ordinary short sales. Clause (2) is intended to
prevent "sales against the box," i.e., transactions by possessors of inside
information whereby they sell their holdings, but keep the stock regis-
tered in their names so that their changes of position do not become
known until delivery is made at a later date.'
The insider trader provisions of section 17 of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act 4 are comparable to those of section 16 of the
Exchange Act, but section 17 does not apply to ten-percenters, and it
does not prohibit short sales by insiders; it is not, however, confined
to equity securities. Related to these two sections is section 30(f) of
the Investment Company Act which regulates insider trading in any
securities issued by a registered closed-end investment company. 5
D. SEC Proxy Rules
In the case of most of the larger American corporations the owner-
ship of voting shares is held in comparatively small blocks by a vast
number of shareholders scattered over a wide geographical area. Under
these conditions the factors of expense, inconvenience and inertia com-
bine to dissuade all but a handful of shareholders from attending
shareholders' meetings in person; without provision for voting by
proxy even a quorum is unattainable. In these large-scale corporations
the practice has developed of management soliciting the shareholders
to appoint as their proxies one or more persons designated by manage-
ment. Almost invariably enough shareholders sign these printed
"management" proxies and return them to the corporation in the
conveniently enclosed addressed and stamped envelope, so that manage-
ment exercises a majority of the voting power and thus controls the
82. 48 STAT. 897 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c ) (1952).
83. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., Zd Sess. 25 (1934).
84. 49 STAT. 830 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79q (1952).
85. 54 STAT. 836 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(f) (1952).
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forthcoming "shareholders" meeting. In many instances those re-
sponding to such proxy solicitation have practically no idea of what
matters management will bring before the meeting or of how manage-
ment will exercise its proxy voting power. This use of the proxy
machinery has thus given rise to management rather than stockholder
control of the most influential corporations, and the resulting decline
in corporate democracy has become a matter of congressional concern.
At first sight there might appear to be no connection between
regulation of the over-the-counter securities market and regulation of
management solicitation of shareholders' proxies. But here again
Congress and the Commission have utilized the disclosure philosophy,
and curtailment of illicit insider trading has been an interesting by-
product. Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act states that
"It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails
or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
any facility of any national securities exchange or otherwise to
solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or
consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than
an exempted security) registered on any national securities ex-
change in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors." 6
Comparable provisions are to be found in section 12(e) of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act 7 and section 20(a) of the
Investment Company Act.1
8
The proxy rules promulgated by the Commission require that each
person solicited must be or have been furnished with a written proxy
statement containing various specified items of information. Copies of
these proxy statements must be filed with the Commission. In con-
nection with the election of directors the proxy statement must reveal
the securities of the corporation held by each nominee, and every person
solicited by management must receive an annual report containing
financial statements that adequately reflect the financial position and
operations of the corporation. Moreover, if proxies are solicited with
respect to such matters as merger, consolidation or re-arrangement of
the share structure, every solicited shareholder must be supplied with
financial statements substantially similar to those which are required
in connection with a registration statement. Under varying circum-
stances, many more items of information are required to be contained
86. 48 STAT. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1952).
87. 49 STAT. 823 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 791(e) (1952).
88. 54 STAT. 822 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20(a) (1952).
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in the proxy statements, and all of this data is of value to investors in
enabling them to arrive at informed opinions as to the corporation's
securities. This proxy literature, unlike registration statements and
reports to the Commission, goes directly into the hands of investors.
The net result is that a device primarily aimed at securing greater
corporate democracy has incidentally narrowed, although by no means
eliminated, the opportunities for illicit profit from insider trading.
For the same reasons, it would seem desirable to extend the proxy
disclosure requirement to all securities subject to federal jurisdiction.
E. Rule X-1OB-5
This rule, previously set forth,89 specifically declares it to be
unlawful for any person, inter alia, "to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made . . . not misleading"
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Accordingly,
this rule, too, has an important part in the legislative program for
combatting non-disclosure by officers, directors and controlling persons.
Violations of the rule have resulted in about a dozen injunction actions
by the Commission and a considerable number of private actions for
rescission or damages. A corporation buying in its own securities
has under this rule a duty to disclose similar to that of an officer,
director or controlling person.
The first case holding section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
rule X-10B-5 to be applicable to non-disclosure by an insider was
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.91 In his opinion in this case Chief
Judge Kirkpatrick stated: "Under any reasonably liberal construction,
these provisions apply to directors and officers who, in purchasing
the stock of the corporation from others, fail to disclose a fact coming
to their knowledge by reason of their position, which would materially
affect the judgment of the other party to the transaction." 92 In the
case of Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,' the court, in arriving at a
comparable holding, stated that the rule requiring disclosure by in-
siders "is an attempt to provide some degree of equalization of bar-
gaining position in order that the minority [shareholders] may exercise
an informed judgment in any such transaction." 9
89. See text at note 40 supra.
90. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b-5 (Cum. Supp. 1944).
91. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
92. Id. at 800.
93. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
94. Id. at 829.
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Rule X-10B-5 applies not only to transactions on the exchanges
and in the over-the-counter market, but also to all transactions in
securities between any two persons. If an insider engages in a short-
swing transaction, he may subject himself to a dual liability: he may
be liable to the corporation under section 16(b) for any resulting profit,
and he may be subject to an action by the other party to the transaction
under rule X-10B-5 for rescission or damages.
VI. FEDERAL REGULATION OF MALPRACTICES OF BROKERS, DEALERS
AND BROKER-DEALERS IN OVER-THE-COUNTER TRANSACTIONS
A. Registration
Congress has given the Commission great power over the activities
of brokers, dealers and broker-dealers by requiring such persons to
register with the Commission as a condition precedent to engaging
lawfully in over-the-counter transactions, and authorizing the Com-
mission to revoke registration for violation of its rules and regulations.
Section 15 of the Exchange Act 95 is the key statute. As originally
enacted in 1934, it provided for the registration of all brokers or
dealers who make or create an over-the-counter market and also for
the registration of all such over-the-counter securities; and this section
further declared it to be unlawful for brokers and dealers to make or
create an over-the-counter market in violation of rules and regulations
prescribed by the Commission. This was an effort to assimilate the
over-the-counter market to a national securities exchange, and to
provide investors with comparable protections. But in 1936, before
the Commission had progressed very far, even with the registration
of brokers and dealers, section 15 was amended to eliminate the neces-
sity of registering every security for which an over-the-counter market
was created, and to substitute a requirement of periodic supplements to
registration statements filed under the Securities Act of 1933. This,
of course, meant that many over-the-counter securities would be wholly
unregistered, and that as to such securities no public source of in-
formation might be available to investors. But the 1936 amendment
strengthened the section by codifying the rules and regulations of the
Commission concerning the registration of brokers and dealers and
by clearly establishing the power of the Commission to deny or revoke
registration; and section 17 of the Exchange Act was amended to give
the Commission power of inspection over registered brokers and
dealers. Moreover, by a further amendment of section 15 in 1938 the
rule-making power of the Commission was broadened to afford protec-
95. 48 S'AT. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1952).
OVER-THE-COUNTER SECURITIES
tion against fictitious quotations in the over-the-counter market and
safeguards with respect to financial responsibility of over-the-counter
brokers and dealers.
As amended in 1936, section 15(a) provides:
"No broker or dealer (other than one whose business is
exclusively intrastate) shall make use of the mails or of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any
transaction in, or to induce the purchase or sale of, any security
(other than an exempted security or commercial paper, bankers'
acceptances, or commercial bills) otherwise than on a national
securities exchange, unless such broker or dealer is registered in
accordance with subsection (b) of this section." 96
This section is confined to over-the-counter transactions, and a broker
need not register if he conducts his business exclusively on a national
exchange, either through his own membership or that of another acting
as his agent. Most stock exchange firms, however, do some over-the-
counter business and hence are registered. If a broker or dealer and
his customers are all in the same state, he will be regarded as doing
solely an intrastate business and need not register, even though the
securities in which he deals may have been issued by corporations not
within the state.
The registration requirement applies only to brokers and dealers,
and not to traders. A trader resembles a dealer in that he, too, aims
to profit from the purchase or sale of securities, but not as a business.
He does not handle other people's money or securities; he does not
"make a market"; he does not supply market quotations or render
incidental investment advice, etc.
B. Denial and Revocation of Registration
Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act authorizes the Commission
to deny registration to or to revoke the registration of any broker or
dealer if it finds that such denial or revocation is in the public interest,
and if such broker or dealer (1) has wilfully included any false or
misleading statement as to a material fact in his application for
registration, or (2) has been convicted within ten years preceding the
filing of any such application, or at any time thereafter, of any felony
or misdemeanor involving the purchase or sale of any security or arising
out of the conduct of the business of a broker or dealer, or (3) is
enjoined by any court from engaging in any conduct or practice in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security, or (4) has
96. 49 STAT. 1377 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §78o(a) (1952).
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wilfully violated any provision of the Securities Act or of the Exchange
Act or of any rule or regulation thereunder."
By specific provision in this section a broker or dealer may also
be denied registration, or have his registration revoked, if "any partner,
officer, director, or branch manager" of, or "any person directly con-
trolling or controlled by," said broker or dealer is himself subject to
one of the aforesaid four disqualifications.9" The Commission holds
that any employee is a controlled person; hence a broker-dealer firm
cannot escape responsibility for a subordinate's misconduct even though
the firm may not have been specifically aware of his actions. Moreover,
if a person whose registration has been revoked subsequently becomes
employed by another broker or dealer, the latter's registration will be
subject to revocation unless prior clearance is obtained from the
Commission.
As indicated above, section 15 (b) expressly authorizes the Com-
mission to revoke the registration of any broker or dealer who has wil-
fully violated any portion of the Securities Act or the Exchange Act
or of the rules and regulations thereunder. This provision in effect
enables the Commission, if it so desires, to supersede the courts and
to constitute itself a quasi-judicial forum for processing violations of
these acts, revocation being a speedier and more decisive penalty than
the common-law or statutory remedies that might be invoked through
judicial proceedings. This administrative jurisdiction is limited,
however, to cases of "willful" violation.
If a person has had registration denied or revoked for a willful
violation, he cannot obtain a re-examination of this decision by the
simple expedient of filing another application for registration, for the
first determination will be regarded by the Commission as having a
continuing and conclusive effect. The term "willfully" does not
necessarily imply intent to violate the statute or any evil motive. A
broker or dealer will be held by the Commission to have acted "willfully"
if the proof indicates that he in fact knowingly did the acts with which
he is charged, although he may not have appreciated that these acts
constituted a statutory violation.
In exercising its authority to act "in the public interest," the
Commission may decree a conditional withholding of revocation, con-
ditioned, for example, upon a firm and an individual broker or dealer
becoming disassociated. Moreover, in exercising its "public interest"
discretion, the Commission has on occasions determined to visit upon
a violator some lesser penalty than revocation; it may, for example.
97. 49 STAT. 1378 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1952).
98. Ibid.
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require merely suspension from membership in a stock exchange or
in the National Association of Securities Dealers.
Revocation hearings may be public or private at the discretion
of the Commission, but it is the inveterate practice of the Commission
to conduct a public hearing if the respondent so requests. The Com-
mission favors public hearings and hence it does not always accede to
a respondent's desire for a private hearing.
C. Withdrawal and Cancellation of Registration
If a registered broker or dealer files a specified notice with the
Commission, he may withdraw his registration. Section 15(b)
of the Exchange Act expressly provides for such withdrawal "upon
such terms and conditions as the Commission may deem necessary in
the public interest or for the protection of investors." 19 Normally, in
the absence of a revocation proceeding, a withdrawal notice becomes
effective on the thirtieth day after its filing. But if revocation proceed-
ings are pending against a registered broker or dealer, the Commission
may, at its discretion, refuse to permit him to withdraw his registration.
An application for registration not as yet acted upon may be withdrawn
at any time.
Section 15(b) also authorizes the Commission to cancel a regis-
tration or application upon a finding that the registrant or applicant
"is no longer in existence or has ceased to do business as a broker or
dealer." "0 Except in the case of physical or corporate death, it is
not the practice of the Commission to cancel registration by ex parte
proceedings, although the act does not specifically require notice and
opportunity for hearing.
D. Post-Registration Requirements
One of the most important controls of the Commission over
brokers and dealers is to be found in that portion of section 17(a)
of the Exchange Act which requires registered brokers and dealers
to keep such accounts and records and to file such reports as the
Commission may prescribe. 1' This section also authorizes the Com-
mission, by its examiners and other representatives, to make such
periodic inspections of these accounts and records as it may deem
appropriate. These inspections serve not only to disclose violations,
and to familiarize the brokers and dealers with the applicable rules
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. 48 SrAT. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1952).
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and regulations, but also to bring to the Commission's attention con-
ditions which may indicate a need for new regulations or for amend-
ments of existing rules.
E. Capital Requirements
Although the federal securities legislation does not impose any
bonding requirement upon brokers and dealers, the Commission has
utilized its authority under section 15 (c) (3) 102 to accomplish a related
result. The Commission has put into effect a rule that requires brokers
and dealers, whether or not registered, to maintain a twenty-to-one
ratio between aggregate indebtedness and net capital.' The only
exemptions relate to brokers who do not extend credit to customers or
who are members of certain specified exchanges whose requirements are,
in this respect, more stringent than those of the Commission.
F. Special Anti-Fraud Provisions Applicable to Brokers and Dealers
Misconduct by brokers and dealers was often facilitated by the
fact that the customer had no clear understanding as to whether he
was doing business with a dealer or being represented by a broker, and
also that he had no accurate indication of the extent of the profit or
commission accruing to the broker-dealer from the transaction. This
situation has been remedied to some degree by applicable provisions
of the federal securities legislation and by rules and regulations pre-
scribed by the Commission. Section 11(d) (2) of the Exchange Act
makes it unlawful for a broker-dealer to effect a transaction without
making a written disclosure to the customer as to whether he is
acting as a dealer for his own account or as a broker for either buyer
or seller.104
G. Confirmation Requirement
Under section 15(c) (1) of the Exchange Act the Commission
has promulgated a number of rules. One of them, rule X-15C-4, is
the confirmation rule.' 5 It requires a written confirmation to be given
or sent to the customer at or before the completion of every over-the-
counter transaction. The confirmation must not only disclose in which
capacity a broker-dealer is acting and for whom, but also, if he is acting
as a broker, it must set forth the amount and source of his commission,
the name of the person buying from or selling to the customer, and the
102. 52 STAT. 1075 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (1952).
103. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (Supp. 1944).
104. 48 STAT. 892 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78k(d) (2) (1952).
105. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-4 (1939).
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date and time of the transaction. If the confirmation indicates that
the broker-dealer is engaged in the transaction as a principal, i.e., as
a dealer, there is no rule explicitly requiring him to disclose the amount
and source of his profit. But one may not escape the status of a fiduciary
by merely declaring himself to be a principal, and an excessive profit
of a dealer (or commission of a broker), even though disclosed, may
be actionable as a violation of a fiduciary standard.
H. "Churning"
The general anti-fraud provisions, as indicated heretofore,"0 6
are section 17 (a) of the Securities Act,0 7 rule X-10B-5 1o8 under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act,' and section 15 (c) (1) of the Exchange
Act."0 These provisions are particularly applicable to misconduct by
brokers and dealers, and most of the regulations aimed at curbing the
major temptations of broker-dealers stem from these provisions and
the rules developed thereunder. For example, in the case of a discre-
tionary account a broker may be tempted to augment his commissions
by "churning" the account, i.e., buying and selling securities for the
account more frequently than exclusive concern for the customer's
interests would justify. Rule X-15C1-7 seeks to check this by providing
that transactions for a discretionary account may not be "excessive in
size or frequency in view of the financial resources and character"
of the account."' "Churning" is not limited to discretionary accounts;
it may occur whenever a customer is accustomed to follow a broker's or
dealer's suggestions, and the latter induce him to engage in excessive
trading. Such procedure, while not expressly covered by rule X-15C-7,
is a violation of section 17(a) (3) of the Securities Act " 2 and also
of rule X-15C-2, which defines "manipulative, deceptive, or other
fraudulent device or contrivances" 113 as used in section 15(c) (1) of
the Exchange Act.114
J. Excessive Spreads
Probably the major temptation with which a dealer is beset is
that of seeking an unreasonable profit from an over-the-counter trans-
106. See pages 13-16 supra.
107. 48 S rA'r. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1952).
108. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (Cum. Supp. 1944).
109. 48 STAT. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1952).
110. 48 STAW. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1) (1952).
111. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-7 (1939).
112. 48 STAT. 85 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (3) (1952).
113. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-2 (1939).
114. 48 STAT. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1) (1952).
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action. In deciding the case of Duker v. Duker,"5 a revocation proceed-
ing, the Commission evolved the principle that it is a fraud on the part
of a dealer to consummate a transaction with a customer at a price not
reasonably related to the current market. This has come to be known
as the "shingle" theory, because it is based upon the idea that when a
dealer hangs out his shingle he impliedly represents that he will not
impose upon the public, even in those transactions where technically
he is acting "at arm's length" and not as an agent or broker. The
theory assumes, furthermore, that one of the details of this implied
representation is that the dealer's prices will approximate the current
market unless he unmistakably indicates that this is not so.
This doctrine was upheld in 1943 by the Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, in the case of Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC."6 In this case
the court affirmed an order of the Commission revoking the petitioner's
registration as a broker and dealer, on the ground that petitioner had
wrongfully sold securities to customers at prices ranging from sixteen
to forty-one per cent above the market price at which petitioner sub-
sequently bought the securities for delivery to the customers. This
was held to be a willful violation of section 15(c) (1) of the Exchange
Act and section 17(a) of the Securities Act. In reaching its decision
the court said:
"An over-the-counter firm which actively solicits customers
and then sells them securities at prices as far above the market as
were those which petitioner charged here must be deemed to
commit a fraud. It holds itself out as competent to advise in the
premises, and it should disclose the market price if sales are to be
made substantially above that level. Even considering petitioner
as a principal in a simple vendor-purchaser transaction (and there
is doubt whether, in several instances at least, petitioner was
actually not acting as broker-agent for the purchasers, in which
case all undisclosed profits would be forfeited), it was still under a
special duty, in view of its expert knowledge and proffered advice,
not to take advantage of its customers' ignorance of market con-
ditions. The key to the success of all of petitioner's dealings was
the confidence in itself which it managed to instill in its customers.
Once that confidence was established, the failure to reveal the
mark-up pocketed by the firm was both an omission to state a
material fact and a fraudulent device. When nothing was said
about market price, the natural implication in the untutored minds
of the purchasers was that the price asked was close to the
market. . . . The essential objective of securities legislation is
to protect those who do not know market conditions from the
115. 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939).
116. 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943).
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overreachings of those who do. Such protection will mean little
if it stops short of the point of ultimate cbnsequence, namely, the
price charged for the securities." "'
If a dealer does not have in his portfolio the securities his customer
desires to purchase, he may buy them at the market from another dealer
and then resell them to the customer at a profit. So long as this spread
is reasonable in relation to the current market, -the "shingle" theory
is not violated. The important question is how great may this spread
legitimately be. A 1943 survey conducted by the National Association
of Securities Dealers revealed that in seventy-one per cent of the over-
the-counter transactions of its members the gross spread has not
exceeded five per cent. But in determining "reasonableness" of spread,
consideration should be given not only to the results of this survey but
also to such factors as market activity of the security in question,
price range, and total monetary size of the transaction.
A dealer who is also in the business of an investment adviser is
held to a higher fiduciary standard than that discussed above in relation
to a dealer who counsels his customers merely as an incident of his
business as a dealer. The dealer-investment adviser, although avowedly
acting as a principal, has placed himself in a position of trust and
confidence in relation to his customer, and is therefore subjected to a
stricter obligation than merely to avoid taking a price that is not rea-
sonably related to the current market price. He must make a full and
complete disclosure of every item in the transaction that relates to the
fact that his interest is adverse to that of his customer. In 1949 the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia ratified this doctrine in
the case of Hughes v. SEC."'
The Hughes case involved an appeal by petitioner from an order
of the Commission revoking her registration as a broker-dealer. She
was also registered as an investment adviser under the Investment
Advisers Act,"9 and had about 175 clients to whom she sold advice or
"service" pursuant to a schedule or rates and charges. When a client
placed a buying order with petitioner, she filled it either by supplying
the security from her own inventory or by purchasing it for her own
account and then as a principal selling it to the client. The Commission
ruled that she had willfully violated the general anti-fraud provisions of
the Securities Act and of the Exchange Act by not "fully disclosing to
such clients the nature and extent of her adverse interest, including,
among other things, (1) the best price at which such securities could
117. Id. at 436-37.
118. 174 F2d 969 (2d Cir. 1949).
119. 54 STAT. 850 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3c (1952).
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be purchased for such clients in the open market in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, and (2) the cost to registrant of the securities
sold to such clients." "2 In affirming the Commission's order the
court, after referring to the statutory provisions making unlawful "any
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading," said:
"These quoted words as they appear in the statute can only
mean that Congress forbid not only the telling of purposeful falsity
but also the telling of half-truths and the failure to tell the 'whole
truth.' These statutory words were obviously designed to protect
the investing public as a whole whether the individual investors be
suspicious or unsuspecting. The best price currently obtainable in
the open market and the cost to registrant are both material facts
within the meaning of the above-quoted language and they are
both factors without which informed consent to a fiduciary's acting
in a dual and conflicting role is impossible. . . . It is not enough
that one who acts as an admitted fiduciary proclaim that he or
she stands ever ready to divulge material facts to the ones whose
interest she is being paid to protect. Some knowledge is pre-
requisite to intelligent questioning. This is particularly true in
the securities field. Readiness and willingness to disclose are
not equivalent to disclosure. The statutes and rules discussed
above make it unlawful to omit to state material facts irrespective
of alleged [or proven] willingness or readiness to supply that
which has been omitted." 121
A general anti-fraud provision, modelled after section 17(a) of
the Securities Act but applicable specifically to investment advisers, is
set forth in section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act.1 22  This act
also requires registration with the Commission by persons who are
engaged in the business of selling advice, reports, or analyses concerning
securities.'
VII. SELF-REGULATION OF THE OVER-THE-COUNTER SECURITIES
MARKET (HEREIN OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
SECURITIES DEALERS)
In requiring registration of new securities to be offered to the
public, and in regulating stock exchanges and their members, Congress
obliquely affected the over-the-counter market to the extent that listed
securities are traded over the counter and that stock exchange firms
120. 174 F2d at 971.
121. Id. at 976.
122. 54 S rAT. 852 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1952).
123. 54 STAT. 850 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1952).
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engage in over-the-counter transactions. But aside from the previously
discussed statutory provisions for the registration of broker-dealers
and for combatting fraud, there have been only a few items of federal
legislation directly affecting the conduct of the over-the-counter market.
Thus far the national policy has been in general to minimize direct
statutory intervention with respect to over-the-counter operations and
to encourage supervised self-i'egulation.
The business ethics of those who engage in stock exchange trans-
actions are regulated to a considerable degree by the national stock
exchanges. Moreover, in two important respects the Exchange Act
supplements such regulation: section 6(b) provides that an exchange
may not register with the Commission if it has not adopted rules
providing for "the expulsion, suspension, or disciplining of a member
for conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles
of trade"; "' section 19(a) (3) authorizes the Commission to suspend
or expel from an exchange any member or officer thereof who violates
the act or the Commission's rules.' But the original Exchange Act,
as enacted in 1934, gave the Commission no comparable power in
relation to the over-the-counter market, and although the act was
materially amended in 1936, it was not until enactment of section 15A
(the Maloney Act) in 1938 12 that the Commission acquired specific
power to combat unethical practices in the over-the-counter market.
After enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act, over-the-
counter brokers and dealers began to organize for self-regulation and a
Code of Fair Competition applicable to them, although primarily for
investment bankers, was evolved, and approved by President Roosevelt
in November of 1933. Although this development was halted by the
Supreme Court's determination in 1935 that NIRA was unconstitu-
tional, 11 7 these first steps towards self-regulation were not wasted.
Birth of an organization to aid in policing the industry was impeded
by fear of violation of the anti-trust statutes. But unofficial committees
were active and effective in settling disputes within the industry by
arbitration and mediation. These efforts at self-regulation finally cul-
minated in the enactment of section 15A of the Exchange Act, effective
in June of 1938.
A. Section 15A of the Exchange Act
The primary purpose of section 15A is to provide for the establish-
ment of a mechanism for more direct and effective regulation of brokers
124. 48 STAT. 886 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1952).
125. 48 STAT. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1952).
126. 52 STAT. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1952).
127. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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and dealers than the registration provisions of the Exchange Act
supply. As section 15A is extremely comprehensive and detailed,
considerations of space bar its verbatim inclusion in this Article. But
its substance is so vital to the matter under discussion that its major
provisions must at least be summarized. At the outset section 15A
states that "Any association of brokers or dealers may be registered
with the Commission as a national securities association," "2 under
terms and conditions thereafter provided. To be eligible for regis-
tration an association's rules must admit to membership any reputable
broker or dealer who uses instrumentalities of interstate commerce to
engage in an over-the-counter securities business, unless the Commission
gives the association permission to confine its membership on a geo-
graphical, type of business, or other basis specified by the Commission.
Moreover, the rules of the association must assure internal democracy
in the administration of its affairs, must in enumerated respects promote
just and equitable principles of trade, and must provide that pursuant to
a fair procedure its members shall be appropriately disciplined for
violation of its rules. The section also authorizes the Commission to
review the action of any registered association in disciplining a member
or in refusing admission to a broker or dealer seeking membership, and
the Commission is empowered to modify or set aside the action of the
association.
One of the most important portions is subsection (i) (1) which
authorizes a registered association to prohibit a member from dealing
with any non-member "except at the same prices, for the same com-
missions or fees, and on the same terms and conditions as are by such
members accorded to the general public." 29 The consequence is that
members may grant dealers' discounts, allowances, commissions or
special terms only to other members, and thus from a practical stand-
point over-the-counter brokers and dealers find membership in a regis-
tered association to be virtually mandatory.
Not only is a registered securities association required to supply
the Commission with detailed information as to itself at the time of
registration, but it is also obligated to keep this information up to date
by periodic supplements filed with the Commission. For example, the
Commission must be notified of any change in the rules of a registered
securities association. The Commission may overrule the proposed
change by entering an order disapproving thereof, but if it takes no
such action, the proposed rule will automatically take effect on the
thirtieth day after being filed with the Commission. The Commission
128. 52 STAT. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §78o-3 (1952).
129. 52 STAT. 1073 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1952).
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may, however, subsequently abrogate any rule of a registered securities
association, if after an appropriate hearing it appears to the Commission
that such abrogation is necessary to protect investors or otherwise to
insure fair dealing. The Commission may furthermore compel a
registered securities association to adopt any specified alteration of or
supplement to its rules that appears to the Commission to be necessary
or appropriate in the public interest, provided such rule relates to (1)
the denial of membership or the disciplining of members, (2) the
method of amending the association's rules, (3) the method of choos-
ing officers and directors, and (4) affiliation between registered secu-
rities associations.
Finally, section 15A empowers the Commission, after appropriate
hearing, (1) to suspend or revoke the registration of a registered
securities association for conduct tending to defeat the purposes of
the section, (2) to suspend or expel any member from a registered
securities association for violation of the statute or any rules or regula-
tions thereunder, and (3) to remove from office any officer or director
of a registered securities association who willfully refuses to enforce
the rules of the association or who abuses his authority.
The primary purpose of the Maloney Act (section 15A) was to
encourage over-the-counter brokers and dealers to form one or more
associations through which they might engage in effective self-regulation
comparable to the self-regulation of members of organized exchanges,
subject only to a degree of governmental supervision in the public
interest.
B. The National Association of Securities Dealers
Whatever may have been the expectation of Congress, the fact
remains that since the enactment of section 15A only one securities
association has registered with the Commission. This is the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., more familiarly known as the
NASD, whose application for registration was accepted by the Com-
mission in August, 1938.
The NASD is a private non-profit corporation incorporated in
Delaware. Its certificate of incorporation states "the nature of the
business or objects or purposes to be transacted are to promote through
cooperative enterprise the investment banking business, to standardize
its principles and practices, to promote -therein high standards of com-
mercial honor and to encourage and promote among members the
observance of federal and state securities laws." Membership is open
to any broker or dealer authorized to transact an investment banking or
a securities business under state and federal laws. The current member-
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ship of the NASD includes approximately ninety-five per cent of all
eligible dealers and brokers. The management of the association is
vested in a board of governors elected by the members. This board
has wide powers especially in relation to the adoption, amendment
and interpretation of rules and the disciplining of members.
The NASD is nation-wide in scope, and for purposes of adminis-
tration the country is divided into fourteen districts similar to those
of the Federal Reserve System. Each district, although represented
on the national board of governors, has considerable regional autonomy.
For example, each district may adopt local rules so long as they are
not in conflict with the rules of the national association, and in each
district there is a business conduct committee which has original
jurisdiction of complaints originating in its area. Such proceedings
must, however, be conducted pursuant to a code of procedure adopted
by the national board of governors and insuring a fair hearing.
A significant activity of the NASD is the establishment and en-
forcement of rules of fair practice relating to the professional conduct of
its members. The rules that most frequently invoke disciplinary
proceedings are 1, 4 and 19. Rule 1 is very general in its terms: "A
member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high standards
of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade." '
Rule 4 requires that a member shall buy or sell at a fair price in relation
to the market at the time of the transaction.' Rule 19 concerns the
use of a customer's securities or funds, and provides:
" (a) No member shall make improper use of a customer's
securities or funds. (b) No member shall lend, either to himself
or to others, securities of any customer unless such member shall
first have obtained a separate written authorization from such
customer permitting the lending of securities held for his account
by such member. (c) No agreement between a member and a
customer authorizing the member to pledge securities carried for
the account of the customer either alone or with other securities,
either for the amount due thereon or for a greater amount, shall
justify the member in pledging more of such securities than is
fair and reasonable in view of the indebtedness of said customer to
said member." 's
In each district there is a District Business Conduct Committee
composed of not more than twelve members. These committees,
130. NATIONAL ASSOCIATiON OF SECumiTmS DEALERS, RULES OF FAIR PRACTICE
rule 1 (1939).
131. Id. 4.
132. Id. 19.
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augmented by Local Business Conduct Committees, are the agency
by which the Association's rules of fair practice are administered and
enforced. Any person (not necessarily a member of the Association)
may file a complaint with an appropriate committee, or a committee
may institute a complaint on its own motion. A copy of the complaint
is sent to the respondent which he is required to answer. If either the
complainant, the respondent, or the committee so desire, a hearing will
be held at which complainant and respondent may appear in person
or by counsel and present relevant testimony. If the committee con-
cludes that the respondent has violated one or more of the rules, the
sanctions to which it may resort are various: It may be content to
accept from the respondent a pledge of future compliance; it may censure
or fine him; or it may suspend or expel him from the Association. In
any event, the judgment of the committee is subject to review by the
board of governors, which may either decrease or increase the severity
of the penalty. Moreover, section 15A of the Securities Exchange
Act authorizes either the complainant or the respondent to apply to
the SEC for review of any disciplinary action approved by the board
of governors. Such appeals, however, have been very infrequent.
Decisions of the Commission are, of course, subject to judicial review.
This joint responsibility of the NASD and the SEC for policing
the over-the-counter market is heightened by the fact that the Com-
mission has original jurisdiction to determine the eligibility of certain
applicants for membership in the Association, and that it can, on its
own initiative, bring about the termination of a dealer's membership
in the Association. Moreover, exercise by the Commission of
its power to revoke the registration of a broker-dealer with the SEC
will automatically end his eligibility for membership in the NASD.
One of the most difficult problems faced by the Association is the
matter of mark-ups: What constitutes a fair profit or spread on trans-
actions with the public investor which are not made as part of a
public offering or underwriting? On the basis of the results of a
questionnaire and of years of experience, the board of governors
indicated in 1943 that mark-ups in excess of five per cent would be
regarded unfavorably in the absence of special, justifying circum-
stances. In May of 1949 the Board issued a statement indicating that
the five per cent policy was not applicable to sales in which the member
fully and fairly disclosed, by way of prospectus or otherwise, the mark-
up to his customer. The board added that "A reasonable relationship
of price to customer to the current market is, of course, assumed." 133
133. NASD News, June 1949, p. 2.
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In each of the fourteen districts the Association engages in
periodic spot-checks of the records of its members in order to ascertain
financial condition, methods of doing business, and possible violations
of the Association's rules. This may be undertaken either through
visitation by an examiner or field secretary, or by questionnaire at
times followed by verifying check-up by an accountant.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The free enterprise system operates through a nation-wide bar-
gaining process, and one of the functions of government is to maintain
this process. There is a marked disparity of bargaining power between
the average investor in securities on the one hand and professional
brokers and dealers and corporate officials and insiders on the other.
Justification for governmental regulation of the securities markets is
based mainly upon this fact.
The present federal program of securities legislation is consistent
with the preservation of the free enterprise system, because Congress
has not sought to supersede the bargaining process by dictating to
buyers and sellers of securities the terms of their transactions. The
effort of Congress has been principally to bring about greater equality
of bargaining power. To achieve this, Congress has relied primarily
upon enforced publicity of the facts, knowledge of which is requisite
to bargaining equality. Secondarily, Congress has sought to protect the
investor by recognizing the activities of brokers and dealers as having
the ethical standards and obligations of a profession, thereby virtually
eliminating the concept of an "arm's length" transaction between
broker-dealer and customer. Thus, it is only the standards attending
the bargaining process and not the terms of the consummated trans-
action that Congress has sought to influence, a proper exercise of
governmental power within the framework of a capitalist democracy.
These forms of federal regulation are a marked improvement over
the situation as it obtained under the common law and the "Blue Sky"
laws. But there are still areas of the over-the-counter securities market
where equality of bargaining power has not been achieved.
A. Inadequacy of Disclosure Requirements
The disclosure requirements embodied in the SEC statutes fall
far short of an adequate program of public information about securities
such as would render misrepresentation virtually futile. It is only in
connection with public offerings of new securities that the SEC can
elicit information under section 5 of the Securities Act-and within
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this narrow area there are many exemptions. Even large corporations
can readily avoid the impact of section 5 by obtaining additional
working capital through bank loans, undistributed earnings, or private
placement of new securities, rather than through public offerings.
Information gleaned through the operation of section 12 (a) of the
Exchange Act is confined to securities listed on a national securities
exchange. It must not be overlooked that the listing of a security on
an exchange and registration by the issuer under this section are entirely
voluntary. Many corporations prefer to forego having their securities
traded on an exchange rather than to comply with the listing and
registration requirements. Other companies are too small, too un-
sound, or their securities are too inactive to be acceptable by an ex-
change for listing. All such securities may be traded over the counter,
and section 12(a) furnishes no source of information to the unwary
purchaser.
Similarly, the proxy solicitation provisions of section 14(a) of
the Exchange Act are applicable only to securities registered on a
national exchange; and issuers can conceivably avoid the necessity of
supplying stockholders witl, the stipulated information by the device
of not soliciting proxies.
Both listed and unlisted securities are traded over the counter, but
with the exception of government bonds, which in any event are ex-
empted from the federal securities legislation, the great bulk of over-the-
counter transactions is in unlisted securities. Hence the disclosure
philosophy embodied in the federal program of securities legislation
has failed to serve as a complete antidote to misrepresentation in the
over-the-counter securities market. Unless the registration, reporting,
and proxy requirements are extended to all securities within the juris-
diction of the federal government, the effort to check misrepresentation
by enforced dissemination of pertinent information will continue to be
to some extent ineffectual.
B. Shortcomings of the Anti-Fraud Provisions
The concept of a legal right is illusory unless it is accompanied by
an effective remedy. Similarly, the significance of the declaration of a
duty depends upon the character of the sanctions that may be invoked
if the duty is transgressed. In endeavoring to cope with malpractices
in securities transactions, the most effective portions of the SEC statutes
have been the anti-fraud provisions. But even here there is room for
improvement.
The most important sanction against fraud is the imposition of
civil liability upon the wrongdoer. If, however, a defrauded purchaser
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elects to seek rescission under section 12(2) of the Securities Act,
rather than at common law, he encounters some disadvantages. The
seller's statutory right to defend on the ground of lack of awareness of
his misrepresentation or omission practically limits the purchaser's cause
of action to intentional deceits by the seller, which was not the case at
common law. Moreover, even as to intentional misrepresentations the
statute requires the plaintiff buyer to prove their materiality, a burden
that the common law did not impose upon him. Furthermore, section
13 of the Securities Act establishes a shorter period of limitation (one
year after discovery of the wrong or three years after the purchase,
whichever occurs sooner) than that applicable to a common-law action
for rescission.
Sections 9 (c) and 18 of the Exchange Act impose upon the plain-
tiff the almost impossible task of showing that the price he paid or
received for the security was "affected" by the defendant's misrepresen-
tation, and for this reason the civil liability provisions of these sections
are seldom invoked.
The SEC statutes should be amended so as to broaden the civil
liability provisions and expressly to include civil liability as a remedy
in all appropriate situations, thus eliminating the necessity of relying
on a judicial holding of implied civil liability.
C. Stabilization
Many courts have held that stabilization is legal if its purpose
is in fact to provide support against unusual market conditions in a
sincere effort to protect the interests of shareholders and investors.
But this is not necessarily a sound doctrine. To create a false im-
pression as to the degree of real interest in a security is a form of
deception, regardless of sincerity of purpose. Alleged stabilization
may be used to disguise illicit manipulation. Moreover, stabilization,
if unsuccessful, may magnify loss to investors. That a given offering
of new securities may prove initially unpopular or "sticky" is a risk
inherent in the business of underwriting, and the law should not con-
done efforts to avoid this risk by creating an unreal appearance of
demand for the security at the expense of unsuspecting investors thus
induced to pay artificially inflated prices. The Commission should
re-examine and reconsider its present exercise. of the power that
Congress has given it to regulate or prohibit stabilization.
D. Broker-Dealers
The functions of broker and dealer are usually combined in the
same person or firm. There are many sound arguments in favor of
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the retention of this practice, but there are also some dangers to in-
vestors inherent in the combination. Effective measures must be found
for counteracting these dangers without requiring complete separation
of the businesses of broker and dealer. This is not an easy task
but it can be done, and it would be preferable for it to be done through
self-regulation by the industry rather than by governmental decree.
But one way or another it must be accomplished, if the goal of sub-
stantial equality of bargaining power in the over-the-counter securities
market is to be achieved.
